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APPORTIONING RECEIPTS FROM WASTING
ASSETS UNDER THE UNIFORM LAWS: A
PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
EVELYN GINSBERG ABRAVANELt
Because the value of a wasting asset deteriorates over time,
serious inequities between beneficiaries can arise when wasting
assets are placed in trust. In this Article, Professor Abravanel
surveys the judicial and legislative responses to the problems
posed by wasting assets held in trust. In particular, the author
points to the defects in the approaches taken by the Un/form
Princioal and Income Act and the subsequent RevisedAct. The
Article concludes byproposing a novel solution to theproblem of
wasting assets held in trust.
I. INTRODUCTION
The hallmark of the modem trust' device is the division of owner-
ship between legal and equitable title. The legal title to the trust corpus
is in one party, the trustee, while the equitable title to the assets of
which the trust is composed is in the beneficiaries. Concurrently with
this division of ownership, certain recognized fiduciary responsibilities
are imposed on the trustee for the benefit of the holders of the equitable
title. These fiduciary responsibilities include, among others, the duty to
deal impartially as between the income beneficiaries and the remain-
dermen2 and the duty to produce a normal trust yield while at the same
time preserving the trust corpus intact.
The trustee will be held to the proper performance of these fiduci-
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1972, J.D. 1975, Case Western Reserve University.
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1. The term "trust," as used in this Article, is intended to refer only to the trust device as a
vehicle for the donative disposition of wealth. No reference is made by the use of this term to such
devices as the resulting or constructive trust. See note 14 infra.
2. 2 A. Scoar, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 183, at 1471 n.1 (3d ed. 1967).
3. Id. § 232. There is a plethora of academic and judicial commentary that seeks to rank
the relative rights of the income beneficiaries and the remaindermen of a trust. Professor Bogert,
for example, has stated that the typical settlor evinces a "recognized partiality toward income
beneficiaries" of a trust. Bogert, The Revised Uniform Princpal and Income Act, 38 NOTRE DAME
NORTH CAROLIN4 LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
ary responsibilities.4 The spectre of potential liability in the event he
should fail to discharge them properly requires the trustee to attempt to
reconcile the divergent interests of the income and principal benefi-
ciaries. The difficulty of the trustee's task in this regard is compounded
by the tension, which typically inheres in the trust relationship, be-
tween the competing interests of these two classes of beneficiaries. The
present income beneficiary is primarily interested in having trust assets
invested in a manner that will maximize the current yield on trust in-
vestments. He is not overly concerned with the question of whether the
trustee's investment practices are such as to ensure the safety of princi-
pal. The remainderman, by way of contrast, is primarily concerned
with the safety, and possible enhancement, of trust capital.- This ten-
sion is exacerbated when the trust corpus consists in whole or in part of
wasting property.
Wasting property has been defined as "consist[ing] of such inter-
ests as terminate or necessarily depreciate in course of time either be-
cause of the nature of the interest or because of the character of the
LAW. 50, 57 (1962). By way of contrast, the Kentucky Supreme Court, in a case involving the
duties of a trustee in regard to the corpus of a trust consisting of unproductive property, statcd that
[i]n the early period of trusts it appears that the prevailing thought, with reference to the
trustee's duty, was simply the preservation of the trust for the benefit of remaindermen.
A trustee's duty, where there are present beneficiaries of income and successive interest,
has been a subject of much controversy and has produced divergent judicial opinions.
However, it seems to be a well settled principle that a trustee, in administering an estate
for present beneficiaries of income and for remaindermen, is bound as much to secure
the usual rate of income upon sale investments for the present beneficiary of income as
to preserve the corpus for the benefit of the remaindermen. The creator of the trust
obviously had two objects in view; first, the payment of the income to the life tenant,
and, second, the preservation of the corpus for the remainderman. Certainly, the preser-
vation of the corpus is an essential element of the trust, and any depletion thereof tends
to frustrate the creator's purpose. Likewise, failure to invest in income producing invest-
ments, thereby defeating the benefits to the life tenant, would also tend to frustrate the
settlor's purpose. It, therefore, follows that a trustee is charged with the duty to invest so
as to produce income, and at the same time use a sound discretion in regard to the
preservation of the corpus ...
So, it follows that each beneficiary, and not one of them, has a right to expect a
performance of the trust.
Security Trust Co. v. Mahoney, 307 Ky. 661, 668-69, 212 S.W.2d 115, 119 (1948). It is the opinion
of this writer that, absent an express direction or a clearly inferable intention that the interest of a
particular beneficiary be given priority, the principle that the trustee is under a duty to act impar-
tially towards the different beneficiaries requires that the trustee view them on an equal footing.
See text accompanying notes 124-27 infra.
4. 3 A. ScoTr, supra note 2, at §§ 201-212.3.
5. The enhancement of trust capital can come about if the trustee pursues a policy of invest-
ing in assets that are likely to yield capital appreciation. This proposition is premised on the
notion that proceeds realized on the sale of a principal asset by the trustee remain principal, even
though a gain is realized on the sale. Traditionally, capital gains realized on the sale of trust
corpus have been held to constitute principal for purposes of trust law. Id. § 233.1, at 1898.
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subject matter of the interest.' 6 Stated somewhat differently, a wasting
asset is an asset having a limited duration that produces revenues for
the period of its useful life, but after that ceases to be of value. Com-
mon examples of wasting property are leasehold interests'; copyrightss;
patents9; terminable annuities"°; and interests in natural resources that
are subject to depletion, such as coal, oil and gas, and timber."
This characteristic of a wasting asset, namely that the worth of the
trust corpus will be, in the main, extinguished over the asset's useful
life, has led many courts to observe that the revenues produced by
wasting assets "partake of the nature both of principal and income."12
This notion assumes added significance when one considers the results
that would flow from a finding that the proceeds of wasting property
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 239, Comment a (1959). Professor Scott writes
that "[t]he common element in the case of all such property is that its value will necessarily depre-
ciate or be destroyed." 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at § 239.
7. See, e.g., Minot v. Thompson, 106 Mass. 583 (1871); Frankel v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 152 A.D. 58, 136 N.Y.S. 703 (1912), af'dmem., 209 N.Y. 553, 103 N.E. 1124 (1913); Gould v.
Gould, 126 Misc. 54, 213 N.Y.S. 286 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
8. See, e.g., In re Elsner's Will, 210 A.D. 575, 206 N.Y.S. 765 (1924); In re Estate of Pryor,
51 Misc. 2d 993, 274 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1966); Pickering v. Evans, [1921] 2 Ch. 309.
9. See, e.g., Union County Trust Co. v. Gray, 110 N.J. Eq. 270, 159 A. 625 (1932). In this
case, the corpus of the trust included stock in a corporation whose assets were composed of a
patented process for treating gasoline. It is well settled that, when the corpus of a trust consists, in
whole or in part, of stock in a corporation having wasting assets, the same principles apply as
though the trust owned the wasting property directly. 8 G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS &
TRUSTEES § 827, at 430 nn.20 & 21 (2d ed. 1962).
10. See, e.g., Tickner v. Old, L.R. 18 Eq. 422 (1874); Morgan v. Morgan, 51 Eng. Rep. 214
(M.R. 1851); Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth, 32 Eng. Rep. 56 (Ch. 1802).
11. See, e.g., In re Will of Koffend, 218 Minn. 206, 15 N.W.2d 590 (1944); Cadbury v. Par-
rish, 89 N.H. 464, 200 A. 791 (1938); Leach v. McCreary, 183 Tenn. 128, 191 S.W.2d 176 (1945).
The topic of apportioning receipts from natural resources held in trust is beyond the proper
scope of this Article. The rules concerning this category of depleting assets have had a very differ-
ent evolution from those with which we are here concerned. So as not to constitute too great a
digression, an example will have to suffice. Suppose a testator created a trust of his residuary
estate, the corpus of which included an interest in certain mining properties. By analogy to princi-
ples that have developed in the law of waste as between holders of successive legal interests, the
question of how receipts from these properties are to be distributed will turn on whether the mine
was "opened" at the time of the creation of the trust. If, under the facts of a particular case, this
question is answered affirmatively, then the income beneficiary of the trust will be entitled to all
revenues derived from the operation of the mine. See Millikin Trust Co. v. Jarvis, 34 Il. App. 2d
180, 180 N.E.2d 759 (1962); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 151 Tex. 1, 244 S.W.2d 803 (1951). Otherwise,
all such revenues are allocable to trust capital. Id.; Mairs v. Cent. Trust Co., 127 W. Va. 795, 34
S.E.2d 742 (1945). Some courts, as well as § 9 of the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act,
have seen fit to apportion receipts between principal and income in the context of depleting natu-
ral resources. See, e.g., Bixby v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 55 Cal. 2d 819, 13 Cal. Rptr. 411
(1961); In re Will of Beeler, 203 Misc. 100, 121 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1952). For an extended treatment of
this topic, see Comment, The Apportionment ofProceedsfrom Depletable Natural Resources Held in
Trust, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 391 (1967).
12. In re Elsner's Will, 210 A.D. 575, 576, 206 N.Y.S. 765, 767; accord, Raffety v. Parker, 241
F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1957); In re Pennock's Will, 285 N.Y. 475, 35 N.E.2d 177 (1941).
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are entirely allocable to income or entirely to principal. Assume, for
example, that the corpus of a trust consists of a copyright having a du-
ration of fifteen years at the time of the trust's creation. If the trustee
were to allocate all the revenues produced by the copyright to the in-
come account, such mode of distribution would have horrendous con-
sequences for the ultimate remaindermen.' 3 If, on the other hand,
these revenues were entirely allocable to the principal account, the in-
come beneficiary would receive only the income earned on the reve-
nues derived from the copyright. The ultimate objective, therefore, is
to devise a method by which receipts from wasting assets held in trust
can be apportioned equitably between principal and income.
For the past two centuries, courts and legislatures have pursued
this objective, with varying degrees of success. The purpose of this Ar-
ticle is to analyze those efforts, and to propose a novel method of ap-
portioning receipts from wasting assets held in trust. The first section
of the Article will discuss the approach taken by the English and Amer-
ican courts. Thereafter, the solutions proposed by the 1931 Uniform
Principal and Income Act, and the 1962 Revised Act, will be discussed
and criticized. The Article concludes by proposing a new method of
apportioning receipts from wasting assets that overcomes the defects of
both the common law and statutory formulations.
As the various apportionment methods are discussed, the reader
should gauge the extent to which each method fulfills the following
three criteria: (1) whether the apportionment method allows the trustee
to administer the trust assets in a manner consistent with the general
fiduciary duties imposed on him by operation of law; (2) whether it
treats the differing classes of beneficiaries in an equitable fashion; and
(3) whether it allows convenient trust administration.
II. THE ENGLISH ORIGINS: THE DOCTRINE OF
HowE v EA4.RL oF DA4RTMOUTH 14
To place the topic of trustees' duties with respect to wasting assets
13. See also White v. Blackman, 168 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942). In White, testator's
widow sought to have set aside to her a homestead right in the lands of which her husband died
seized and to recover all the oil and gas royalties and proceeds that had accrued subsequent to her
husband's death. The court noted the injustice of using the "open mine doctrine," which would
"result in such a depletion and impairment of the corpus as to leave it as a skeleton or ghost for
the remainderman," id. at 534, but nevertheless affirmed the lower court's ruling awarding the
proceeds to the widow. The court rested its decision on the Supreme Court's refusal of an applica-
tion for writ of error in a controlling case. Id. at 534.
14. The content ascribed to the term "trust" at note 1, supra, is in need of refinement. First,
the class of trusts with which the common law decisions have been concerned consists of trusts
[Vol. 58
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in an historical perspective, one must begin consideration of the rele-
vant decisional law with the landmark opinion rendered by Lord Eldon
in Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth.15 The case involved the construction of
the Earl of Strafford's will. By the terms of his will, the testator dis-
posed of his real and personal estate, which included long- and short-
term annuities, to persons for successive life estates with remainder
over upon the termination of the final life estate. 6 The particular issue
presented to the Lord Chancellor concerned the estate source from
which the gifts in question were to be satisfied.' 7 Specifically, the ques-
tion was whether, under the terms of the testator's will, there was
merely a specific bequest of the personal property that the testator had
owned at the time the will was executed. An affirmative answer to this
question would have given the life interest holders the enjoyment of the
property as it existed at the testator's death. Lord Eldon concluded that
the will revealed no intention to bequeath the annuities specifically.
Instead, the natural inference from the will was that the testator in-
tended both the life interest holders and the remaindermen to benefit
equally from the gift of the annuities. In order to effectuate this intent,
Lord Eldon held that the annuities, as "perishable" assets, would have
to be converted into a more permanent form of investment.s
that were established pursuant to the terms of a settlor's will. Second, the universe of testamentary
trusts must be further restricted to encompass only those trusts whose corpus is composed of the
settlor's general or residuary estate. This refinement is necessary because different rules have
evolved depending on the estate source from which the testator intends the trust to be created. For
example, when a testator establishes a trust, the corpus of which consists of specfic property, the
courts have almost uniformly held that the receipts derived from such property, even when it is of
a wasting nature, are entirely allocable to the income account. 3 A. ScoTT, supra note 2, § 239.1
n.2. The question of the apportionment of receipts from wasting assets in order to maintain the
value of the trust corpus intact would, accordingly, never arise in this context.
15. 32 Eng. Rep. 56 (Ch. 1802). In the argument of counsel, it appeared that the court's
decision in Howe s,. Earl of Dartmouth was the first reported decision pertaining to the duties of
trustees with respect to wasting assets. Id. at 58. By the same token, however, it also appeared in
argument that the rule enunciated by the court had been established for many years. Id.; accord,
Macdonald v. Irvine, 8 Ch. D. 101, 113 (Ch. App. 1878) (Bagallay, L.J. dissenting); Pickering v.
Pickering, 41 Eng. Rep. 113, 116 (Ch. 1839).
16. 32 Eng. Rep. at 57.
17. Id. at 60.
18. The Lord Chancellor wrote:
It is given as all his personal estate; and the mode, in which he says it is to be enjoyed, is
to one for life, and to the others afterwards. Then the Court says, it is to be construed as
to the perishable part, so that one shall take for life, and the others afterwards; and
unless the testator directs the mode so that it is to continue, as it was, the Court under-
stands, that it shall be put in such a state, that the others may enjoy it after the decease of
the first;
I am clearly of opinion therefore, that this is not a case, in which the personal estate
is in this sense specifically given, with a direction, that it shall remain specifically such as
it was at the testator's death; and the purposes, for which it is given, are those, for which
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The reasoning behind the decision in Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth
and its progeny' 9 has sometimes been misunderstood. It is not that
there is a presumption that the testator, in establishing the trust, had in
mind the wasting nature of the assets constituting the trust corpus and,
therefore, intended that they be converted into a nonperishable form in
order to preserve the value of the trust corpus intact for those ulti-
mately entitled to it. On the contrary, if a testator has created a trust of
his residuary estate for successive beneficiaries, the natural inference, in
the absence of an expression of a contrary intent on the part of the
testator, is that the testator intended that those persons entitled in re-
mainder should, at the expiration of the preceding interests, come into
the possession of the entire residuary estate, undiminished by reason of
the enjoyment of income by the prior interest holders. In order to actu-
alize the testator's presumed intention, it is incumbent upon the trustee
to convert wasting assets into permanent, income-producing invest-
ments at the inception of the trust."z In short, Howe v. Earl of
Dartmouth established a rule of construction to the effect that, in the
absence of language or circumstances indicating a contrary intention,
the testator is presumed to have intended that the wasting property was
to be converted and the proceeds of sale reinvested in such a manner as
to ensure the enjoyment by the successive beneficiaries of a trust in an
undiminished trust corpus.
Perhaps the best explication of the rule of Howe v. Earl of
Dartmouth is contained in a dissenting opinion by Lord Baggallay in
Macdonald v. Irvine.z t The estate of the testator included certain
it is admitted there is a general rule, that these perishable funds are to be converted in
such a way as to produce capital, bearing interest.
Id. at 60-61. Some of the chancellor's reasoning is obsolete in light of modem legal principles.
Thus, the notion that every devise of land necessarily constitutes a specific gift by reason of the
doctrine that a will could not operate to pass the title to after-acquired land, id. at 60, is no longer
viable. The prevailing view is, of course, that a will operates on all property forming part of the
testators estate at the time of his death, whether acquired before or after the execution of the will.
See T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS §-85 (2d ed. 1953).
19. The rule of conversion of wasting assets laid down in Howe . Earl of Dartmouth has
been adhered to in many subsequent English decisions. See, e.g., Game v. Young, [1897] 1 Ch.
881; Macdonald v. Irvine, 8 Ch. D. 101 (1878); Tickner v. Old, L.R. 18 Eq. 422 (1874); Morgan v.
Morgan, 51 Eng. Rep. 214 (M.R. 1851); Pickup v. Atkinson, 67 Eng. Rep. 797 (Ch. 1846); Suther-
land v. Cooke, 63 Eng. Rep. 516 (Ch. 1844); Lichfield v. Baker, 48 Eng. Rep. 1267 (M.R. 1840);
Benn v. Dixon, 59 Eng. Rep. 763 (Ch. 1840); Mills v. Mills, 58 Eng. Rep. 929 (Ch. 1835).
20. An alternative means to achieve the dual goals of producing a reasonable yield for the
income beneficiary while at the same time preserving trust corpus intact is to apportion receipts
from wasting assets between the income and principal accounts in some fashion. See text accom-
panying notes 66-76 infra.
21. 8 Ch. D. 101 (1878).
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Egyptian bonds as well as a leasehold estate in a house.22 By the terms
of a codicil to his will, the testator gave his wife a life interest in all his
property,23 thereby postponing the ultimate distribution of his estate
until the termination of the preceding life interest. In a suit for con-
struction of the will and codicil, the widow claimed to be entitled to the
income of the testator's entire personal estate as it was invested at the
time of his death.24 The court held, without further discussion, that the
rule of Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth was applicable to the facts of the
case.25 The property in the residuary estate had to be converted, with
the life tenant being entitled to only the income on the reinvested pro-
ceeds of the sale.
In a dissenting opinion Lord Baggallay asserted that the widow
was entitled to the enjoyment of the property in specie, and set forth the
following exposition of the rule of Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth:
[W]here there is a residuary bequest of personal estate to be enjoyed
by several persons in succession, a Court of Equity, in the absence of
any evidence of a contrary intention, will assume that it was the in-
tention of the testator that his legatees should enjoy the same thing in
succession, and, as the only means of giving effect to such intention,
will direct the conversion into permanent investments of a recog-
nized character of all such parts of the estate as are of a wasting or
reversionary character, and also all such other existing investments
as are not of the recognized character and are consequently deemed
to be more or less hazardous.
But it must be borne in mind that the rule when acted upon is
based upon an implied or presumed intention of the testator, and not
upon any intention actually expressed by him, and Courts of Equity
have consequently always declined to apply the rule in cases in
which the testator has indicated an intention that the property should
be enjoyed in specie, though he may not in a technical sense have
specifically bequeathed it.2
It is, of course, a fundamental principle of will construction that, to
the extent to which the testator's intention can be ascertained, it will
control.2' The paramount importance attached to the testator's inten-
22. Id. at 102.
23. Id. at 104.
24. Id. at 109.
25. Id. at 107.
26. Id. at 112. Lord Baggallay speaks of the necessity of converting property "of a wasting or
reversionary character." The reason for requiring that a reversionary interest be converted is that
such an interest will not generate any revenues until it becomes possessory. As such, it must be
converted in order to allow the income beneficiary a fair yield on that portion of the trust corpus.
3 A. ScoTr, supra note 2, § 240.
27. Intentions can be ascertained either from the language of the instrument itself or from
1980]
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tion in controlling the disposition of his estate is manifest in the present
context of allocating receipts from wasting assets held in trust. When,
for example, the property owner's intention to allocate all the revenues
derived from a wasting asset to the income beneficiary is discernible, 28
that intention should be given effect. That intention should in turn be
operative to rebut the presumption established in Howe v. Earl of
Dartmouth. A few illustrations will clarify this point.29
In Pickering v. Pickering,3" the testator gave his wife a life estate in
"all the interest, rents, dividends, annual produce and profits, use and
enjoyment of all [his] estate and effects,"' 3' with remainder over upon
her death to his son-in-law. The testator's estate included a leasehold
estate for an extended term of years and an annuity of 100 pounds
annually.32 In a suit for construction of the will, 33 it was held that the
widow was entitled to the enjoyment, for her life, of the perishable
property in the testator's estate in specie, without a conversion for the
benefit of the person ultimately entitled to the property in remainder.34
More particularly, Lord Cottenham found in the will a sufficient indi-
extrinsic evidence which is admissible to show what the testator meant by the words used in the
will. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 18, § 146.
28. The term, "discernible," in this context, is somewhat of a misnomer. The courts have
demonstrated a marked propensity for discovering an intention to allocate all receipts from wast-
ing assets to income even though no real indication of intention can be "discerned." Lord Baggal-
lay, dissenting in Macdonald, recognized this proclivity of the courts in his statement that "[t]hese
authorities, for the most part, turn upon the special circumstances of the particular cases under
consideration, but they nevertheless, upon the whole, shew an inclination on the part of successive
Judges to allow small indications of intention to prevent the application of the general rule." 8
Ch. D. at 112-13; accord, Hinves v. Hinves, 67 Eng. Rep. 523, 524 (Ch. 1844).
29. E.g., Brandreth v. Colvin, [1896] 2 Ch. 199; Gray v. Siggers, 15 Ch. D. 74 (1880); Hinves
v. Hinves, 67 Eng. Rep. 523 (Ch. 1844); Daniel v. Warren, 63 Eng. Rep. 127 (Ch. 1843); Vaughan
v. Buck, 41 Eng. Rep. 559 (Ch. 1841); Goodenough v. Tremamondo, 48 Eng. Rep. 1280 (M.R.
1840); Pickering v. Pickering, 48 Eng. Rep. 1090 (M.R.), af'd, 41 Eng. Rep. 113 (Ch. 1839); Be-
thune v. Kennedy, 40 Eng. Rep. 320 (Ch. 1835); Collins v. Collins, 39 Eng. Rep. 1113 (Ch. 1833);
Alcock v. Sloper, 39 Eng. Rep. 1111 (M.R. 1833).
30. 48 Eng. Rep. 1090 (M.R.), a/I'd, 41 Eng. Rep. 113 (Ch. 1839).
31. 48 Eng. Rep. at 1090.
32. Id. at 1091.
33. The Pickering case arose in a rather complex factual situation. The life tenant had re-
ceived the income from the leasehold estate for some time after the testator's death, but had not
received any payments from the annuity, because both the obligor and the surety on the annuity
were thought to be insolvent. After the death of the surety, however, the remainderman discov-
ered that the surety's estate was actually solvent. The remainderman instituted a suit against the
surety's estate and recovered the unpaid obligation on the annuity. He then obtained an opinion
of counsel that the annuity and the leasehold estate should have been converted at the testator's
death, pursuant to the rule of Howe . Earl of Dartmouth. The life tenant apparently acquiesced
in this opinion, and agreed to a suitable settlement of the estate. At the death of the life tenant,
however, her executor brought this action to challenge the settlement, on grounds that the rule of
Howe v. Earl ofDartmouth should not apply. 41 Eng. Rep. at 114-16.
34. Id. at 118.
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cation of the testator's intent that his widow was to have the enjoyment
of the property in the state in which it was found at the testator's death.
Thus, the case was removed from the operation of the rule of conver-
sion of wasting assets established in Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth."
This intention was evinced in a number of ways. First, the testator
had specifically enumerated the property his wife was to have for life.
The Lord Chancellor found that this enumeration of particulars mani-
fested the testator's intention to specifically devise the property de-
scribed. Further, the testator's use of the terms, "rest and residue of my
estate," militated in favor of a finding that the property of which the
residuary estate was composed, and to which the remainderman was
entitled, was to be ascertained only after the termination of the life
estate. 6
The chancellor's decision in Pickering v. Pickering clearly recog-
nized, however, the continuing vitality of the constructional preference
established in Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth. Lord Cottenham empha-
sized that the rule of Howe v Earl of Dartmouth was controlling unless
a contrary intention of the testator could be found within the four cor-
ners of the instrument. 37 This position should be compared with the
decision in Hinves v. Hinves,3 s which illustrates the lengths to which the
courts have gone in attempting to discern an intention on the part of
the testator that the life tenant should have the enjoyment of the wast-
ing property in specie.
In Hinves v. Hinves, the testator, by the terms of his will, gave his
wife a life income interest in his entire estate,39 which included lease-
hold estates and long-term annuities.' Upon the death of the life ten-
ant, the property was to pass in equal shares to the brothers of the
testator.4' In determining whether the life tenant was entitled to the
enjoyment of the testator's property in specie, Vice-Chancellor Wigram
remarked that "in the more modem cases ... the Court, in applying
35. Id.
36. Id. at 117-18. This phrase appeared in the dispositive provisions of the will only in con-
nection with the disposition of the remainder interest after the termination of the life tenant's
interest. Id. at 117.
37. Id. at 118.
38. 67 Eng. Rep. 523 (Ch. 1844).
39. More particularly, the testator's will provided that his wife was to have the "income of
[his] property of all descriptions whatsoever, for her natural life, at her own disposal, but not to
sell witt [sic] the. . . consent of all parties. ... Id. The reporter indicated that the word "witt"
was "[i]llegible, but resembl[ed] either 'with' or 'without.'" Id. at 523 n.2 (footnotes omitted).
40. Id. at 524.
41. Id. at 523.
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the rule [of Howe v. Earl of Darmouth], has leant against conversion as
strongly as is consistent with the supposition that the rule itself is well
founded. '42 After carefully reviewing the previous decisions holding
that the application of the rule of conversion of wasting assets was ne-
gated under the particular fact situation at issue, the court indicated
that, so as not to rule against the weight of authority, it felt constrained
to hold that the life tenant was entitled to all the revenues derived from
the property in the state in which it was found at the testator's death.43
This result obtained notwithstanding the court's determination that
there were a multiplicity of factors present that tended to confirm the
constructional preference established in Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth.4
Within the line of cases examined to this point, a subset of cases
having particular relevance to the present inquiry45 requires extended
discussion. A series of cases has addressed the question whether a pro-
vision in the governing instrument empowering the trustee to retain
investments received as part of the original trust estate was a sufficient
indication, in and of itself, of the testator's intention that the life tenant
was to have all the revenues derived from the wasting assets initially
received as a distribution from the testator's estate. 6
Brown v. Gellatzy 47 was the first reported decision to address this
narrower issue.48  The testator's estate consisted, in part, of a large
42. Id. at 524; accord, Mackie v. Mackie, 67 Eng. Rep. 831, 834 (Ch. 1845); see Macdonald v.
Irvine, 8 Ch. D. 101, 113 (1878) (dissenting opinion); Morgan v. Morgan, 51 Eng. Rep. 214, 218
(M.R. 1851).
43. 67 Eng. Rep. at 525. It is probably not inaccurate to say that the English courts relied
primarily on precedent to find the rule of Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth inapplicable to the facts of
the particular cases presented to them for decision. See, e.g., Hunt v. Scott, 63 Eng. Rep, 1041
(Ch. 1847). The courts, for the most part, do not appear to have been overly concerned with
whether the testator had sufficiently manifested his intention that the life tenant was entitled to
have the enjoyment of his property in specie. Given the fact-specific nature of this inquiry, it
would appear that the English courts' reliance on precedent was misplaced.
44. The court stated that "[iin the present case the gift is of the testator's 'property' generally;
there is no specification of particulars: and the property described in this general way is to go to
persons in succession. Stopping here, there is no doubt that the rule of the Court would require
conversion .... " 67 Eng. Rep. at 525.
45. The special relevance of this line of cases to the present inquiry will only become appar-
ent in connection with the consideration of § 10 of the Uniform Principal and Income Act, See
text accompanying notes 119-27 infra.
46. Eade v. Nicholson, [1909] 2 Ch. Ill; Brandreth v. Colvin, [1896] 2 Ch. 199; Wood v.
Thomas, [1891] 3 Ch. 482; Gray v. Siggers, 15 Ch. D. 74 (1880); Porter v. Baddeley, 5 Ch. D. 542
(1877); Tickner v. Old, L.R. 18 Eq. 422 (1874); In re Sewell's Estate, L.R. II Eq. 80 (M.R. 1870);
Brown v. Gellatly, L.R. 2 Ch. 751 (Ch. App. 1867). See also Hodgson v. Bates, [1907] 1 Ch. 22;
Nixon v. Sheldon, 39 Ch. D. 50 (1888). In addition, there are a number of cases in which the court
placed no apparent reliance on the trustee's authority to retain original trust investments. Gabel-
lini v. Woods, [1904] 2 Ch. 4; In re Llewellyn's Trust, 54 Eng. Rep. 592 (M.R. 1861).
47. L.R. 2 Ch. 751 (1867).
48. The earlier case of Green v. Britten, 46 Eng. Rep. 257 (1863), may be readily distin-
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number of securities, some of which were not authorized investments
for fiduciaries. 49 The testator, by the terms of his will, gave his execu-
tors the power to retain as investments certain specified securities.5" In
a suit between the life tenants of shares of the residuary estate and the
remaindermen, it was held that the life tenants were entitled to receive
all the revenues produced by the securities that formed part of the orig-
inal trust estate. 1 This holding was predicated upon the notion that
the power of retention given to the executors under the testator's will
transformed the wasting property into authorized investments.5 2
It would appear that the reasons proffered by the court for its hold-
ing in Brown v. Gellatly are not analytically sound. To hold, as the
court did, that the mere authorization to the fiduciary to retain assets
delivered in trust evinces a sufficient intention on the part of the testa-
tor that the property is to be enjoyed by the tenant in specie, thereby
rebutting the presumption established in Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth,
does not comport with modem notions of trust administration. 3 To-
guished because in that case there was an absolute prohibition against conversion of the wasting
property for a specified period. This express prohibition was the premise for the court's holding
that the life tenant was entitled to the enjoyment of the wasting property in specie. 46 Eng. Rep. at
259.
49. L.R. 2 Ch. at 753. In England, a trustee historically could invest trust assets only in
government securities, absent broader authorization under the terms of the governing instrument.
The breadth of the trustees' investment authority has since been enlarged by statute. See 3 A.
Scorr, supra note 2, § 227.4.
In the United States, most jurisdictions have statutes designating the permissible types of
investments that a fiduciary may make. Id. § 227.13 n.1. When the terms of the document en-
large or restrict the available investment opportunities, the terms of the instrument control. In the
absence of a contrary provision in the will or the trust, the statutes in "legal list" states enumerate
all the categories of assets in which the fiduciary may invest. Id. § 227.13. Historically, and in a
few states today, these statutes limited fiduciaries to investments in debt securities only. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE tit. 19, § 3-120 (1975). Today, many statutes provide that a certain fraction of the trust
estate may be held in the form of common stocks. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 44-6-2(h) (Supp.
1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 881.01 (West 1979).
50. The testator's will provided, in pertinent part: "I give [my executors] full power to invest
at their discretion, or allow to remain as at present invested, all my funds in government and
colonial government securities, guaranteed railway stock and debentures, East India bonds and
stock, marine insurance shares, and shares in the London Chartered Bank." L.R. 2 Ch. at 753
(emphasis in original).
51. Id. at 758.
52. Lord Cairns wrote that
while any such securities form part of the testator's estate the tenant for life is, in my
opinion, entitled to the specific income of the securities, just as if they had been £3 per
Cent. Consols. I understand the words of the will as amounting to the constitution by
the testator of a larger class of authorized securities than this Court itself would have
approved of, and the Court has merely to follow his directions, and treat the income
accordingly, as being the income of authorized securities.
Id. at 758-59.
53. Arguably, the ruling in Brown v. Gellatoy did not even comport with notions of trust
administration extant at the time the case was decided. In Wood v. Thomas, [1891] 3 Ch. 482, for
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day, a majority of jurisdictions provide by statute that fiduciaries may
retain investments received from the testator even though they would
not be proper investments for a fiduciary to make in the first instance. 4
The intended effect of a retention provision, whether contained in a
statute or the controlling instrument, is to bring assets received from
the estate within the permissible categories of investments that a fiduci-
ary may make .5  Thus, when the trust instrument or applicable statute
authorizes the retention of assets held by the decedent or settlor, the
assets are automatically transformed into legal investments for
fiduciaries, even if they are outside the legal list. Merely to say that the
wasting assets have been converted into authorized investments for
fiduciaries, however, is not tantamount to a demonstration of the inten-
tion necessary to rebut the constructional preference established in
Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth.6
Another case in which the trustees were authorized to retain in-
example, Justice Kekewich, in reference to Brown . Gellafy, stated that, "I do not think that that
will carry you far enough; I think you must find a direction that the tenant for life shall enjoy in
specie. The mere fact that it is authorized is not, standing alone, sufficient." Id. at 487.
Indeed, most of the cases that have adopted the holding of Brown v. Gellally, will not with-
stand analysis. For example, in In re Sewell's Estate, L.R. 11 Eq. 80 (M.R. 1870), the court found
the rule of Howe v. Earl f/Darlmouth to be inapplicable because of the inclusion of the following
provision in the testator's will: The testator directed his trustees "as soon as conveniently may be
after [his] decease [to] sell and convert into money so much and such part thereof as in their sole
discretion they may think necessary for the purpose of paying and discharging all [his] mortgage
and other just debts and funeral testamentary expenses." Id. at 81. It appears anomalous that the
court found this general directive in the will for the trustees to pay the testator's debts to be
tantamount to a positive intent that the wasting property was to be enjoyed by the life tenants Mn
specie. By means of such a clause, the testator was simply attempting to vest his trustees with
discretion to control the order in which his property was to abate. For a discussion of the doctrine
of abatement, see T. ATKINSON, supra note 18, at § 136. Similarly, in Gray v. Siggers, 15 Ch. D.
74 (V.C. 1880), the court, without benefit of analysis, concluded that "the case is entirely taken out
of Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth and Macdonald v. Irvine, because of this power which gives the
trustees the right to retain the property in specie." Id. at 77.
Still other cases that have been cited as support for the principle enunciated in Brown v.
Gellatly are readily distinguishable on their facts. Thus, in Nixon v. Sheldon, 39 Ch. D. 50 (1888),
the holding of the court was expressly limited to a case in which the trust res was not composed of
any wasting assets. Id. at 53. In Hodgson v. Bates, [1907] 1 Ch. 22, the court found that the
property in question was of a hazardous, and not of a wasting, nature. Id. at 25.
54. These statutes typically apply to both trustees and personal representatives. E.g., CAL.
CIv. CODE § 2261 (West Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-89 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 12, § 3304 (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1518 (1975); S.C. CODE § 21-11-30 (1976); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 30.24.060 (Supp. 1978).
55. See, e.g., Watson v. Craven, [1914] 1 Ch. 358, 373; Hodgson v. Bates, [1907] 1 Ch. 22, 27.
Although beyond the scope of the present inquiry, other effects that have been attributed to reten-
tion provisions include: (I) the fiduciary does not have to dispose of the otherwise unauthorized
asset as soon as possible; and (2) although not relaxing the fiduciary's duty to exercise reasonable
care, it does afford the fiduciary a bit more flexibility. In re Mereto Estate, 373 Pa. 466, 468-69, 96
A.2d 115, 116 (1953); In re Stirling's Estate, 342 Pa. 497, 504, 21 A.2d 72, 75-76 (1941). For an
extended treatment of this topic, see Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 187 (1956).
56. See note 53 supra.
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vestments received as part of the original trust estate is Wood v.
Thomas.57 The testator's residuary estate included certain bonds that
were deemed to constitute wasting property because, although they
were redeemable at par at a future date, their market value was then
considerably above par." In a suit to determine the disposition of the
income arising from those bonds pending their ultimate conversion, it
was held, in an opinion by Justice Kekewich, that the life tenants were
entitled to the whole net income of the bonds.59 The court in dictum,
however, made the following pronouncement, which is of special rele-
vance to the present inquiry:
I am not prepared to hold that where there is a direction for
conversion of personal estate, followed by a power of retention of
existing securities in the absolute discretion of the trustees, and then
there are trusts for tenants for life, and afterwards for remaindermen,
the power of retention necessarily gives the tenants for life the enjoy-
ment in specie of the securities retained by the trustees in the exercise
of their discretion. I believe that so to hold would be against the law
as laid down in many cases and many text-books, and against the
practice of conveyancers, . . . and I think that no such doctrine re-
ceives any support from the decisions of Mr. Justice North in In re
Sheldon and Lord Cairns in Brown v. Gellatly. I do not think either
Mr. Justice North or Lord Cairns intended to decide, or did decide,
any abstract question of the kind.60
Lest it appear as if there has been anything approximating una-
nimity in the courts' rulings regarding this question, it should be noted
that, quite to the contrary, substantial diversity of opinion exists. For
instance, in Porter v. Baddeley,6t the testator gave his wife a life interest
in his residuary estate with remainder over to five individuals in equal
shares.62 The residuary estate consisted, in part, of four leasehold es-
57. [1891] 3 Ch. 482. The court's statement of facts indicates that the testator's will provided
that
it should be lawful for his trustees or trustee in their or his absolute discretion to retain
any securities or property which should belong to him at his decease, unconverted and in
the state of investment or security in which the same should then be, for such period or
periods as they or he should think fit, without being answerable for any loss which might
be occasioned thereby.
Id. at 483.
58. Id. at 484. Bonds have a market value above par because they pay interest above the
current market rate. As the time for redemption (at par) approaches, the market value approaches
par. Thus, when bonds have a market price above par, there is a built-in decline in the value of
the bonds until the time of redemption.
59. Id. at 487-88.
60. Id. at 486 (emphasis in original).
61. 5 Ch. D. 542 (1877).
62. Id. at 542-43.
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tates and several long-term annuities.63 There was no direction in the
will that any portion of the testator's estate be converted; instead, the
testator empowered his trustees to retain any property received as part
of the original trust estate in the state in which it was found at the date
of the testator's death.' 4 In a suit to determine whether the life tenant
was entitled to receive all the income derived from the long-term annu-
ities that formed part of the original trust estate, the court held that the
power of the trustees to retain wasting assets delivered as part of the
original trust estate was not a sufficient indication of the testator's in-
tention to overturn the rule of Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth.65
Certain practical disadvantages inhered in the rule requiring that
wasting assets be converted and the proceeds of sale reinvested in a
permanent form from which the life tenant was to have the income and
the remainderman receive the principal intact upon the termination of
the preceding interest. For example, the wasting assets might prove to
be unmarketable, or difficult to sell other than at a severe loss, which
would inure to the detriment of all persons beneficially interested in the
trust estate.66 Because of these practical difficulties, a natural and logi-
cal modification took effect by which, in lieu of disposing of the wasting
asset, an apportionment of the revenues derived from the asset was
made in a manner that at least ostensibly secured to the life tenant and
remainderman the economic equivalent of their respective interests. 67
63. Id. at 543.
64. Id. at 542-43.
65. The court stated that
[tihe clause expressly authorizing and empowering the trustees to allow all moneys to
remain in the same state of investment on which they should find the same as at the
testators decease is a general one, and a general provision of that kind I cannot consider
as being, as between the beneficiaries, applicable to that part of his personal estate which
was invested in terminable annuities.
Id. at 544; accord Tickner v. Old, L.R. 18 Eq. 422 (1874). See also Gabellini v. Woods, [1904] 2
Ch. 4; In re Llewellyn's Trust, 54 Eng. Rep. 592 (M.R. 1861).
66. "It is often very difficult to carry out the principle of Howe v. Lord Dartmouth." Picker-
ing v. Pickering, 41 Eng. Rep. 113, 118 (1839). On a more contemporary note, Professor Judith T.
Younger has written that
[tihe very features which give rise to the duty to sell, however, make it difficult to sell
without loss to the trust. In consequence, a sale may never take place, or only after years
of delay. Nonetheless, when the trustee receives the proceeds from a delayed sale or
collects receipts from wasting assets he is required to make some immediate adjustment
between the rights of income beneficiary and remainderman: he does this by apportion-
ing the money between them.
Younger, Apportioning Receipts from Wasting and Unproductive Assets: A Comment on the New
Princile and Income Act, 40 NY.U. L. REv. 1118, 1119 (1965).
67. For cases in which apportionment principles were applied, see, e.g., Pickering v. Evans,
[19211 2 Ch. 309; Wareham v. Brewin, [1912] 2 Ch. 312 (Ch. App.); Gabellini v. Woods, [1904] 2
Ch. 4; Porter v. Baddeley, 5 Ch. D. 542 (1877); Brown v. Gellatly, L.R. 2 Ch. 751 (Ch. App. 1867);
In re Llewellyn's Trust, 54 Eng. Rep. 592 (M.R. 1861); Meyer v. Simonsen, 64 Eng. Rep. 1316
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This apportionment procedure has been variously denominated "amor-
tization" and "notional conversion."6 .
For example, in Pickering v. Evans, 69 the testator's estate included
copyrights on his aunt's literary works, which she had bequeathed to
him.70 By the terms of his will, the testator bequeathed all his real and
personal estate, with the exception of certain specified property, to his
trustees, who were directed to pay the income derived therefrom to the
testator's widow. Upon the death or remarriage of the first life tenant,
the trustees were directed to divide the trust fund into three equal
shares and to pay the income from each share to one of the testator's
siblings for life, with remainder over to the children of the life tenant.71
During the course of administering the trust estate, the trustees pe-
titioned for declaratory relief and requested instructions on the treat-
ment to be accorded royalties received from the copyrights belonging to
the trust estate.72 The court concluded that there was not a sufficient
indication of the testator's intention to take the case outside the pur-
view of the rule established in Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth.73 The court
did not, however, order the conversion of the wasting assets. Instead,
an apportionment remedy was decreed. Specifically, the value of the
copyright would be ascertained as of one year after the testator's death,
and the life tenants would be entitled to interest on that value at the
rate of four per cent per annum.74 Any revenues produced by the copy-
rights in excess of the amount allocable to the income beneficiaries
were deemed to constitute the trust corpus.7" The court also allowed
(V.C. 1852); Glengall v. Barnard, 49 Eng. Rep. 571 (M.R. 1842); Caldecott v. Caldecott, 62 Eng.
Rep. 903 (V.C. 1842); Taylor v. Clark, 66 Eng. Rep. 990 (V.C. 1841); Gibson v. Bott, 32 Eng. Rep.
37 (Ch. 1802); Sitwell v. Bernard, 31 Eng. Rep. 1174 (Ch. 1801).
68. The phrase "notional conversion" appears in many of the earlier cases, see, e.g., Gabel-
lini v. Woods, [1904] 2 Ch. 4, 12, whereas the adoption of the term "amortization" seems to be of
comparatively recent origin.
69. [1921] 2 Ch. 309.
70. Id. at 314.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 312.
73. Id. at 315-16.
74. Id. at 316.
75. Id. at 317. By allocating a portion of the revenues derived from the wasting property to
the trust principal, it is contemplated that, over the asset's useful life, the fair market value of the
asset at the time it was received in trust will be put back into the trust. For example, assume that
the corpus of a certain trust includes a copyright having a duration of 15 years. The trustee, under
the doctrine of notional conversion, is required to treat the wasting asset as though it had been
sold at its fair market value on the date the trust was created. Assume further that the fair market
value of the wasting asset, as determined by the trustee, equals $100,000. If the average return on
trust investments is, let us say, 5% per annum, the trustee would have to allocate to the income
account $5,000 annually out of the revenues produced by the wasting asset. The balance of such
1980]
270 NORTH CAROLINA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 58
the income beneficiaries to receive the amount of income produced
from the reinvestment of sums previously allocated to principal.76
III. THE RECEPTION OF THE RULE OF HOWE v EARL OF
DARTMOUTH IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, the development of trustees' duties with
respect to wasting assets held in trust essentially parallels that of
England. By the late nineteenth century, many American courts had
adopted the principle that, when the trust estate is composed of general
or residuary assets that are perishable in nature, the trustee is required
to dispose of the assets with reasonable promptness and reinvest the
proceeds of sale in legal securities,7" absent an indication of a contrary
intention in the will. Just as in England," the American rule requiring
the conversion of wasting assets was deemed to be a rule of construc-
receipts would be allocated to trust principal. Assuming that the trustee correctly valued the copy-
right, that portion of the revenues produced by the asset that is allocated to the amortization fund
over the asset's useful life should be equal to $100,000. the value of the corpus at the commence-
ment of the trust, but only if interest earned on the amount set aside for principal is credited to the
principal account. This can be illustrated by the following calculations. In arriving at a fair mar-
ket value of $100,000 for the copyright the trustee theoretically discounts back all the predicted
future payments from the copyright at the assumed annual rate of return of 5%. For ease of
calculation, further assume that these future payments are to be equal annual payments for the
next 15 years. Using this assumption we can calculate that a fair market value of $100,000 repre-
sents 15 annual payments of $9,634.23. This figure is obtained by multiplying $100,000 times
.0963423, which is the annuity that if paid annually for 15 years would have a present value of I.
See C. REEVES, HANDBOOK OF INTEREST ANNUITY AND RELATED FISCAL TABLES 75 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as INTEREST TABLES]. Each year, as the $9,634.23 comes in, $5,000 is allocated
to the income beneficiary (5% X $100,000) and the remainder, $4,634.23, to principal. If the
amounts allocated to principal were not allowed to receive interest, at the end of 15 years there
would be $69,513.45 in the principal account ($4,634.23 x 15). If, on the other hand, the amounts
allocated to principal were allowed to earn interest at the assumed rate of 5% compounded annu-
ally, at the end of 15 years there would be $100,000 in the principal account thus wholly preserv-
ing the principal intact. This figure is obtained by multiplying $4,634.23 times 21.578564, which is
the amount one dollar received annually will accumulate to over a 15 year period at a 5% annual
compound interest. See id. at 46.
76. Id. at 317. But see note 75 supra.
77. See, e.g., Burnett v. Lester, 53 Ill. 325 (1870); Healey v. Toppan, 45 N.H. 243 (1864);
Union County Trust Co. v. Gray, 110 N.J. Eq. 270, 159 A. 625 (1932); Ott v. Tewksbury, 75 N.J.
Eq. 4, 71 A. 302 (1908); Howard v. Howard, 16 N.J. Eq. 486 (1864); Ackerman v. Vreeland, 14
N.J. Eq. 23 (1861); Rapalye v. Rapalye, 27 Barb. 610 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857); Spear v. Tinkham, 2
Barb. Ch. 211 (N.Y. 1847); Emmons v. Cairns, 2 Sand. Ch. 369 (N.Y. 1845); Covenhoven v.
Shuler, 2 Paige Ch. 122, 21 Am. Dec. 169 (N.Y. 1830); Bryan v. Harper, 177 N.C. 308, 98 S.E. 822
(1919); Ritch v. Wilson, 78 N.C. 377 (1878); Saunders v. Haughton, 43 N.C. 217, 57 Am. Dec. 581
(1852); Jones v. Simmons, 42 N.C. 178 (1851); Smith v. Barham, 17 N.C. 420 (1833); Robertson v.
Collier, 10 S.C. Eq. 370 (1833); Patterson v. Devlin, 76 S.C. Eq. 459 (1827); Golder v. Littlejohn,
30 Wis. 344 (1872).
78. See text accompanying notes 19 & 20 supra.
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tion.79 Accordingly, the applicability of the rule to the facts of a partic-
ular case was made subject to the testator's contrary intention."0
Another point at which the English and American precedents con-
verge is the relative ease with which the presumption established in
Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth can be overcome.81 An example is Britt v.
Smith. 2 The testator gave his wife an estate in all his real and per-
sonal property, which was to terminate upon her death or remarriage. 3
Upon the termination of the wife's interest, the testator left "the bal-
ance of. . . [his] personal property of every description" to his sister.84
At his death, the personal property in the testator's estate consisted of
farming implements, crops, livestock and the like.85
To determine the respective rights of the life tenant and remain-
derman, the testator's personal representative maintained an action for
construction of the will. Specifically, the executor sought a determina-
tion of whether the life tenant was entitled to have the enjoyment in
specie of the testator's personal estate.86 After a discussion of the gen-
79. Eg., In re Will of Koffend, 218 Minn. 206, 224-25, 15 N.W.2d 590, 600 (1944); Haywood
v. Wright, 152 N.C. 403,413-14,67 S.E. 982, 987 (1910); Britt v. Smith, 86 N.C. 305, 308-09 (1882).
80. Gay v. Focke, 291 F. 721 (9th Cir. 1923); Harrison v. Foster, 9 Ala. 955 (1846); Bucking-
ham v. Morrison, 136 Ill 437, 27 N.E. 65 (1891); Nelligan v. Long, 320 Mass. 439, 70 N.E. 2d 175
(1946); Dexter v. Dexter, 274 Mass. 273, 174 N.E. 493 (1931); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Shaw, 261
Mass. 158, 158 N.E. 530 (1927); New England Trust Co. v. Eaton, 140 Mass. 532,4 N.E. 69 (1886);
In re Will of Koffend, 218 Minn. 206, 15 N.W. 2d 590 (1944); Cadbury v. Parrish, 89 N.H. 464,
200 A. 791 (1938); Langley v. Town of Farmington, 66 N.H. 431, 27 A. 224 (1891); Bonbright v.
Bonbright, 142 N.J. Eq. 642, 61 A.2d 201 (1948); Code v. Monkhouse, 47 N.J. Eq. 73, 20 A. 367
(1890); In re James, 146 N.Y. 78, 40 N.E. 876 (1895); Frankel v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 152
A.D. 58, 136 N.Y.S. 703 (1912), qfl'dmem., 209 N.Y. 553, 103 N.E. 1124 (1913); In re Will of
Pollak, 208 Misc. 988, 145 N.Y.S.2d 415 (Sur. Ct. 1955); In re Will of Sampson, 193 Misc. 166, 83
N.Y.S. 2d 200 (Sur. Ct. 1948); In re Bruen's Estate, 83 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sur. Ct. 1948); In re Estate of
Hopkins, 171 Misc. 910, 14 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Sur. Ct. 1939); In re Estate of Hilliard, 164 Misc. 677,
299 N.Y.S. 788 (Sur. Ct. 1937), aft'd, 254 A.D. 879, 5 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1938); In re Estate of Hall, 127
Misc. 238, 216 N.Y.S. 598 (Sur. Ct. 1926); Burwell v. Raleigh Banking & Trust Co., 186 N.C. 117,
118 S.E. 881 (1923); In re Estate of Knowles, 148 N.C. 461, 62 S.E. 549 (1908); Britt v. Smith, 86
N.C. 305 (1882); Kinnard v. Kinnard, 45 Pa. 108 (1836); Calhoun v. Furgeson, 24 S.C. Eq. 160
(1850); Leach v. McCreary, 183 Tenn. 128, 191 S.W.2d 176 (1945); McFadden v. Blair, 42 Tenn.
App. 434, 304 S.W.2d 93 (1957); Golder v. Littlejohn, 30 Wis. 344 (1872).
81. Compare cases discussed at text accompanying notes 38-44 supra with Britt v. Smith, 86
N.C. 305, 307 (1882) and Leach v. McCreary, 183 Tenn. 128, 132, 191 S.W.2d 176, 178 (1945).
Indeed, one court has even reversed the presumption of Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth. In Gay v.
Focke, 291 F. 721 (9th Cir. 1923), the court stated the applicable rule in the following terms: "The
general rule is firmly settled that in order to work a conversion while the property is yet actually
unchanged in form, there must be a clear and imperative direction in the will to convert." Id. at
725.
82. 86 N.C. 305 (1882).
83. The eventual disposition of the estate was also subject to certain specific gifts that are not
relevant to the present inquiry.
84. Id. at 306.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 305-06.
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eral rule of conversion of wasting assets as it had developed in the
courts of the jurisdiction, the court stated that the rule
has never been a favorite one with [the English] courts; and the effect
of the later cases has been to allow very slight indications of a
contrary intention, on the part of a testator to prevent its application
S. ., and such certainly has been the tendency of the decisions made
in this Court ....
The court then limited the application of the rule to only those cases in
which the gift of the residue was given under that name.88 Indeed, the
court even suggested that the rule of Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth is in-
operative in all cases in which the bulk of a person's estate is disposed
of by means of a residuary bequest.89
American jurisdictions are split on whether the life tenant is enti-
tled to the actual income of the wasting investments forming part of the
original trust estate when the will empowers the trustee to retain those
assets.90 The courts of Massachusetts, 9' Minnesota 92 and Tennessee 93
have consistently held that such a grant of authority evinces a sufficient
indication of the testator's intention that the life tenant was to have all
revenues derived from the wasting assets constituting part of the origi-
nal trust estate.94 Contrary results have been reached by the courts of
87. Id. at 307.
88. The court stated that "no operation has in any instance been given to the rule, save in the
case of a residuary bequest, given eo nomine, as such." Id. (emphasis in original).
89. Id. at 307-08; accord, Patterson v. Devlin, 16 S.C. Eq. 459 (McMul. Eq. 1827). Viewed in
light of the standards that had been enunciated, the Britt court found that the testator's will
evinced a sufficient indication of his intention that the life tenant was entitled to the enjoyment of
the perishable property in the testator's estate in specie. 86 N.C. at 309-10. Its holding in this
regard was premised upon the following lines of analysis. First, the gift of the residue to the wife
encompassed the bulk of the testator's property. Id. at 309. Second, the court found that the
individual items in the testator's estate, rather than the residue itself, were the subject of the gift to
the widow. Id. at 308.
90. This split mirrors the division of opinion that existed in the English decisions that had
addressed the question. See text accompanying notes 46-65 supra.
91. Nelligan v. Long, 320 Mass. 439, 70 N.E.2d 175 (1946); Dexter v. Dexter, 274 Mass. 273,
174 N.E. 493 (1931); New England Trust Co. v. Eaton, 140 Mass. 532, 4 N.E. 69 (1886).
92. In re Koffend's Will, 218 Minn. 206, 15 N.W.2d 590 (1944).
93. Leach v. McCreary, 183 Tenn. 128, 191 S.W.2d 176 (1945); see McFadden v. Blair, 42
Tenn. App. 434, 304 S.W.2d 93 (1956).
94. Other cases apposite to the present inquiry may be found as well. In Buckingham v.
Morrison, 136 Ill. 437, 27 N.E. 65 (1891), the court found a provision in the testator's will, which
permitted his executors to continue a partnership business in which the testator was interested, to
be a sufficient indication of his intention that the life tenant was entitled to receive all profits
arising from that interest. Similarly, in Gay v. Focke, 291 F. 721 (9th Cir. 1923), a provision in the
testator's will, which provided that his trustees could, in their discretion, dispose of certain real
property, was deemed to constitute an implied power of retention. As such, the court affirmed the
exercise of the trustees' discretion in paying all the net rentals received from that property to the
life income beneficiary of the testamentary trust.
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New Jersey,95 Rhode Island96 and South Carolina.97
The opinion of the court in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Shaw9" illus-
trates the line of cases in Massachusetts holding that, when the trustee
is authorized to retain original trust investments, the case is removed
from the operation of the general rule of conversion of wasting assets.99
This case arose upon a petition by trustees for instructions under the
testator's will." ° More particularly, the trustees requested instruction
regarding the manner in which dividends from stock of a mining cor-
poration forming part of the corpus of the residuary trust were to be
distributed.' 0 ' In rejecting the trustees' contention that some portion of
the dividends ought to be allocated to the principal account in order to
preserve the principal intact, 0 2 the court set forth its rationale as fol-
lows:
[T]he stock held by the trustees in the Consolidated Company is an
authorized investment and no duty has ever rested upon the trustees
either to convert the stock which was in the estate into another form
of investment or to hold and administer the stock interest as if a con-
version had been made at the date of its acquisition. The effect upon
the rights of the life beneficiaries and the remaindermen in the resi-
due of the estate which resulted from the exercise of the powers con-
95. Union County Trust Co. v. Gray, 110 N.J. Eq. 270, 276-77, 159 A. 625, 628-29 (1932).
96. Industrial Trust Co. v. Parks, 57 R.I. 363, 382, 190 A. 32, 40-41 (1937). Contra, Rhode
Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Bradley, 41 R.I. 174, 192, 103 A. 486, 492 (1918).
97. Robertson v. Collier, 10 S.C. Eq. 370 (1 Hill Eq. 1833). The New York courts have
adopted a similar, though not identical, position. These courts have consistently found that an
authorization to retain original investments is simply one factor to consider in determining
whether the instrument evinces a sufficient indication of the testator's contrary intention to over-
come the constructional preference of Howe v. Earl ofDartmouth. Thus, though a retention power
may be given some weight, it is not the dispositive factor. In re Will of Sampson, 193 Misc. 166,
83 N.Y.S.2d 200 (Sur. Ct. 1948); In re Bruen's Estate, 83 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sur. Ct. 1948); In re Estate
of Hopkins, 171 Misc. 910, 14 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Sur. Ct. 1939).
98. 261 Mass. 158, 158 N.E. 530 (1927).
99. See cases cited notes 91-94 supra.
100. 261 Mass. at 160, 158 N.E. at 531.
101. The testator's will provided, in pertinent part:
I authorize and empower my Trustees in their discretion to continue as long as they
think wise to hold stock in mining companies and any other securities or property of any
kind which may be found in my estate at my death, even though the same be unproduc-
tive of income or be of a kind not usually considered suitable for Trustees to select or
hold, or be a larger proportion in one investment than the Trust Estate should hold.
Id. at 163, 158 N.E. at 532.
102. The trustees had assumed that the stock of a mining corporation constituted a wasting
asset. Accordingly, it was their contention that
the life beneficiaries should receive in any year out of the dividends received by the
trustees from these mining shares a fixed net return of five per cent, computed upon the
market value of the shares on the day preceding the commencement of the trust year, as
being equivalent to a fair net income for customary trust funds and that the net income
excess should be added to the trust capital.
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ferred upon the trustees . . . was to convert the . . . stocks into
permanent authorized investment ....
In a situation like the case before this court there is no room for
the operation of the equitable doctrine that personal property given
in general terms in trust to be enjoyed by several persons in succes-
sion imports an intent on the part of the testator that the gift should
be converted into authorized investments and the income of the
property so invested, or retained, be so divided or apportioned be-
tween the life beneficiaries and the remaindermen that the corpus of
the fund shall be kept intact. 10 3
The result that was arrived at in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Shaw
may be meaningfully compared with that which obtained in a New
Jersey case, Union County Trust Co. v. Gray.1°4 In this case, the testa-
tor's estate included shares in a corporation, whose sole asset was a
patented process for treating gasoline.'0 5 The testator, by the terms of
his will, authorized his executors and trustees to retain as trust invest-
ments any property of which he died possessed. 10 6 In a suit maintained
by the executors for instructions on how to disburse the dividends on
those shares, the court found that the will did not evince a sufficient
indication of the testator's contrary intention to take the case out of the
purview of the general rule.0 7 With respect to the specific question
whether the authorization to retain original investments, without more,
is sufficient to rebut the presumption of Howe v. Earl ofDartmouth, the
court clearly answered in the negative. It stated that the clause empow-
ering the executors and trustees to retain assets that were received as
part of the original trust estate
is merely an indemnity to the trustees that, by continuing the voting
certificates as assets of the estate, they will incur no personal liability,
and the power to retain them as part of the trust estate, without re-
sponsibility, etc., as provided in the residuary clause, is simply by
way of further assurance; in truth, the power given to the trustees to
"invest and reinvest" the estate implies that it should be converted.
There is no indication of intention to vary the relative rights of the
legatees, or that the rule of conversion should not obtain.' 08
Hence, just as in England, 10 9 there is a division of authority in this
103. Id. at 167, 158 N.E. at 533-34.
104. 110 N.J. Eq. 270, 159 A. 625 (1932).
105. Id. at 273, 159 A. at 627.
106. Id. at 272, 159 A. at 627.
107. Id. at 277, 159 A. at 629.
108. Id. at 277-78, 159 A. at 629; accord, Industrial Trust Co. v. Parks, 57 R.I. 363, 382, 190 A.
32, 40-41 (1937). See also text accompanying notes 53-56 Supra (criticizing Brown v. Gellatl,).
109. See text accompanying notes 61-65 supra.
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country on the effect of a retention provision with respect to the rule of
conversion.
The modification of the rule of Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth that
permits the apportionment of receipts from wasting property in lieu of
their sale is illustrated by the oft-cited case of In re Elsner's Will.I °
There the testator, an author, had entered into a contract with a pub-
lisher to write a medical treatise. By the terms of the contract, he as-
signed to the publisher all rights to the work, including the exclusive
right to take out copyrights. The consideration received by the testator
was the right to receive from the revenues derived from sales, after pay-
ment of the cost of publication, a certain percentage of the retail price
of books sold at a profit."I
On February 17, 1916, soon after the book had been completed
and, apparently, after it had been published, the testator died." 2 By his
will he created trust estates, the principal of which consisted, in part, of
the right to the royalties under the contract." 3 The income of the trust
estates was directed to be paid to certain beneficiaries, with remainder
over after their demise. 14 The royalties under the contract totalled ap-
proximately $4,000 for the year of 1916, but declined precipitantly to as
little as $13.50 for the last six months of 1923."1
The task before the court was to determine an appropriate means
to disburse these royalties." 6 Applying the doctrine of notional con-
version, the court held, in substance, that the royalties received under
the contract should be apportioned between principal and income in
some fashion.' '7 In the course of its opinion, the court stated that in
the event the trust estate consists of wasting property that is not the
subject of a specific gift,
the rule has long been established that the person given the use or
income is entitled to receive only the income on the value of the
property at the death of the testator. . . , with a duty to account for
the principal to the remaindermen . . . . Ordinarily, it is regarded
the duty of the executors or trustees to convert such property into
money and invest it in permanent securities, paying the income over
110. 210 A.D. 575, 206 N.Y.S. 765 (1924).
111. Id. at 576, 206 N.Y.S. at 766.
112. Id.
113. The terms of the will did not contain any specific reference to the book or the rights
under the contract. Id. at 576, 206 N.Y.S. at 767.
114. Id. at 576, 206 N.Y.S. at 766.
115. Id. at 577, 206 N.Y.S. at 767.
116. Id. at 576, 206 N.Y.S. at 766.
117. Id. at 580, 206 N.Y.S. at 770.
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to the person entitled thereto for life, or a term of years, retaining in
their hands the principal sum for the benefit of the remainder-
men. . . If such property is retained by the executors, then there
should be an apportionment of value between the principal and the
income. "
Having traced the evolution of the duties of trustees at common
law with respect to the treatment to be accorded wasting assets held in
trust, we can now examine the statutory formulation of those duties.
IV. THE STATUTORY FORMULATION OF THE RULE OF
CONVERSION OF WASTING ASSETS
A. The Uniform Princzoal and Income Act
The first attempt to achieve uniformity among the states with re-
spect to their laws governing the disposition of revenues derived from
wasting assets held in trust was made in 1931. In that year the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated,
and sent to the states for adoption, the Uniform Principal and Income
Act. 119
Section ten of the Act 20 governs the treatment to be accorded
wasting assets that constitute the corpus of a trust. It provides for the
118. Id. at 579, 206 N.Y.S. at 769; accord, In re Estate of Hall, 130 Misc. 313, 224 N.Y.S. 376
(Sur. Ct. 1927); Gould v. Gould, 126 Misc. 54, 213 N.Y.S. 286 (Sup. Ct. 1925); In re Estate of
Golding, 127 Misc. 821, 216 N.Y.S. 593 (Sur. Ct. 1924). The rule of apportionment adopted in the
principal case has been adhered to in otherjurisdictions. Eg., Gaede v. Carroll, 114 N.J. Eq. 524,
169 A. 172 (Ch. 1933); Union County Trust Co. v. Gray, 110 N.J. Eq. 270, 159 A. 625 (Ch. 1932);
Inre Estate of Wells, 156 Wis. 294, 144 N.W. 174 (1913).
119. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FORTY-FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE 120 (1931). As of August 31, 1978, the UNIFORM PRIN-
CIPAL AND INCOME ACT, 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 633 (1970) (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"),
had been adopted in 24 states. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDIN6S OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS EIGHTY-SEV-
ENTH YEAR 320 (1978).
120. The full text of § 10 is as follows:
Principal Subject to Depletion
Where any part of the principal consists of property subject to depletion, such as
leaseholds, patents, copyrights and royalty rights, and the trustee or tenant in possession
is not under a duty to change the form of the investment of the principal, the full amount
of rents, royalties or return from the property shall be income to the tenant; but where
the trustee or tenant is under a duty, arising either by law or by the terms of the transac-
tion by which the principal was established, to change the form of the investment, either
at once or as soon as it may be done without loss, then the return from such property not
in excess of five per centum per annum of its fair inventory value or in default thereof its
market value at the time the principal was established, or at its cost where purchased
later, shall be deemed income and the remainder principal.
UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 10, 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 682 (1970).
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apportionment of receipts from wasting property "where the trustee
...is under a duty ...to change the form of the investment." 121
When the trustee is not under such a duty,'22 however, the Act stipu-
lates that "the full amount of rents, royalties, or return from the prop-
erty shall be income to the tenant." 23
Significantly, section ten makes no provision for amortization of
principal to offset the diminution in value incurred as a result of the
wasting away of the principal account when the trustee was not under a
duty to change the form of investment of the trust assets. The drafts-
man of the Act apparently proceeded on the assumption that the settlor
wished to confer the greatest benefit on the income beneficiaries of the
trust.' 24 That assumption, in the context of proposing a uniform act, is
remarkable in a number of respects. First, this provision contravenes
existing common law principles, which hold that the income benefici-
ary is not necessarily entitled to the actual income of the investments
forming part of the original trust estate merely because the instrument
empowered the trustee to retain the assets.125 Second, it adopts, in es-
sence, a rule of construction with regard to the settlor's intention when
a number of equally plausible hypotheses can be constructed. When
the trust instrument authorizes the retention of assets, that authoriza-
tion might have been made with or without reference to whether the
receipts from those assets should be apportioned between the principal
and income accounts in some fashion. 26 For example, the settlor
121. Id.
122. This would be the case, for example, when the instrument empowered the trustee to re-
tain wasting assets received as part of the original trust estate.
123. UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 10, 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 682 (1970). The
allocation scheme mandated by § 10 of the Act controls absent an indication of a contrary inten-
tion under the terms of the governing instrument. Id. § 2. Similarly, the applicability of the
provisions of the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act is also subject to the property own-
er's contrary intention. REvISED UNIFORM INCOME AND PRINCIPAL ACT § 2(a)(1), 7A UNIFORM
LAws ANN. 429 (Master ed. 1978).
124. Thus, Professor Clark, the draftsman of the Act, stated that
the general theory. .. was that where the testator has created or left [wasting] property,
he probably wishes his tenants, those who are dependent on him, to receive the full
benefit of all the return without trying to apportion it a certain part to principal and a
certain part to income. So where that is apparently contemplated and the property is
properly held as a part of the trust we are giving all to the tenant.
Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, at E-69 (1931).
125. At the very least, this provision fails to take cognizance of the substantial diversity of
opinion that exists concerning this question. See text accompanying notes 46-65 & 90-109 supra.
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 239, Comment e (1959) provides in pertinent part:
Where by the terms of the trust there is a general authorization to retain trust prop-
erty included in the trust at the time of its creation, it is a question of interpretation
whether such authorization permits the trustee to retain wasting property, and if so
19801
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might authorize the retention of a particular asset simply because of his
conviction that the asset is likely to yield a higher return than is true of
trust investments generally.
In addition to these difficulties, a serious tension exists between the
allocation scheme mandated by section ten of the Act, on the one hand,
and the fiduciary duties imposed on all trustees, on the other. Specifi-
cally, the trustee's duty to deal impartially as between the income bene-
ficiaries and the remaindermen, and his duty to preserve trust corpus
intact, have arguably been compromised by this provision. The re-
maindermen have hardly received fair treatment at the hands of a
trustee who distributes all the revenues derived from a wasting asset to
the income account, absent an express direction, or clearly inferable
intention, that the interest of the life tenant should predominate. As-
suming that the tenant outlives the asset's useful life, the remaindermen
will succeed to a trust corpus whose fair market value has been abso-
lutely destroyed. This result cannot possibly be consonant with the
trustee's duty to preserve trust corpus intact. Yet that is precisely the
result that would obtain in some factual situations under section ten of
the Act. 127 When the rule of construction that has been chosen oper-
ates to contravene important fiduciary duties that are imposed on trust-
ees, the wisdom of the election that was made, as between the two
competing hypotheses, comes into serious question.
B. The Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act
The impetus for reexamination of the Act came from a number of
whether it permits him to pay to the life beneficiary the whole of the receipts from the
property. Such a general authorization may be interpreted merely to permit the trustee
to retain investments which would not otherwise be proper trust investments because of
their hazardous character, and not to permit the trustee to retain such property as is of a
wasting character. It may be interpreted to permit the trustee to retain all the property
including wasting property, but not to dispense with the requirement of amortization.
On the other hand, it may be interpreted to permit the trustee not only to retain wasting
property but to pay to the life beneficiary the whole of the receipts from the property
without regard to the ordinary requirement that the trust property shall be so invested as
to preserve the principal.
127. The presumption established by this provision of the Act is even more curious when
viewed against the backdrop of prior drafts of a similar provision. In earlier drafts of the Act, the
proposed language would have required a trustee to first apply the receipts from wasting property
in such a fashion as to replenish the value of the principal account. Only after the amount neces-
sary for amortization of the principal had been provided could the income available for distribu-
tion to the tenant be computed. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING 214 (1928); NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
THIRTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING 294 (1929).
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quarters. Most importantly, although the Act had been enacted in ap-
proximately half of the jurisdictions,12 it had frequently been subject
to modification,12 9 with the result that the elusive goal of uniformity
had yet to be realized. In addition, revision was needed in order to
adapt the legislative treatment of principal and income issues to
changes in the law and business experience that had transpired since
the promulgation of the Act. The most notable of these changes came
about in the area of trustee investment practices, particularly because
of the spread of the prudent man investment rule, with the concomitant
elimination of legal list provisions.1 30
Section eleven of the Revised Act provides for the disposition of
revenues derived from wasting property in the following manner:
[Other Property Subject to Depletion]
Except as provided in sections 9 and 10, if the principal consists
of property subject to depletion, including leaseholds, patents, copy-
rights, royalty rights, and rights to receive payments on a contract for
deferred compensation, receipts from the property, not in excess of
5% per year of its inventory value, are income, and the balance is
principal.' 3
1
Although not of a magnitude paralleling other, more discussed
changes brought about by the Revised Act,'32 some significant substan-
128. As of December 1, 1961, the Act had been adopted in 24jurisdictions. NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL
CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS SEVENTIETH YEAR 281 (1961).
129. For example, the prefatory note to the Revised Act indicates that "[wihen the various
states considered and adopted the original Act there were a lot of changes made in the section
concerning disposition of natural resources." UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT, Commis-
sioner's Prefatory Note to 1962 Act, 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 430 (Master ed. 1978).
130. For an extended treatment of the legislative trend away from restricted legal lists and the
development of the prudent man rule, see Fleming, Prudent Investments.: The Varying Standards of
Prudence, 12 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 243 (1977); Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and
Trust-Investment Law, I A.B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1 (1976); Shattuck, The Development of
the Prudent Man Rule for Fiduciary Investment in the United States in the Twentieth Century, 12
OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (1950).
131. REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 11, 7A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 452
(Master ed. 1978). Sections 9 and 10 of the Revised Act provide for the manner in which receipts
from natural resources and timber are to be allocated, respectively. Id. §§ 9, 10. The first phrase
of § 11 exempts these assets from the coverage of the section. Id. § 11.
132. Some of the most significant changes effected by the Revised Act include the following:
(1) section 2 renders the Revised Act inapplicable within the context of legal estates; (2) section
6(c) governs distributions made by mutual funds and real estate investment trusts; and (3) sections
9 and 10 drastically alter the treatment accorded receipts from mineral interests and timber lands.
REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT §§ 2, 6(c), 9, 10, 7A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 429
(Master ed. 1978). For a comparative treatment of the two Uniform Acts, see Bogert, The Revised
Uniform Principal and Income Act, 38 NOTRE DAME LAW. 50 (1962); Bogert, Uniform Principal
and Income Act Revised, 101 TR. & EST. 787 (1962); Note, The Revised Uniform Principal and
IncomeAct-Progress, But Not Perfection, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 473 (1963).
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tive changes did occur with respect to the treatment accorded receipts
derived from wasting assets heldin trust. The most egregious portion
of section ten of the Act-which provided for disbursement of all re-
ceipts to the income beneficiary when the trustee was not under a duty
to change the form of the investment-was entirely deleted. 33 Under
section eleven of the Revised Act, an apportionment of receipts is man-
dated in all circumstances, regardless of whether the trustee is author-
ized to retain the wasting asset. This change worked to bring the
Revised Act more into conformity with accepted common law princi-
ples.134
In analyzing section eleven of the Revised Act, it is necessary to
refer to the definitional provision in which the meaning of the term,
"inventory value," is set forth.' 35 This reference is necessitated by the
section eleven requirement that a trustee compute the income distribut-
able to the tenant as a percentage of this value.' 36 Section 1(2) of the
Revised Act defines "inventory value" as "the cost of property
purchased by the trustee and the market value of other property at the
time it became subject to the trust, but in the case of a testamentary
trust the trustee may use any value finally determined for the purposes
of an estate or inheritance tax." Therein lies the major difficulty with
section eleven of the Revised Act.
The trustee's action in attaching a value to the wasting asset is, at
best, a risky business. Notwithstanding the exercise of the requisite due
care, the trustee's appraisal of a given asset may prove to be incorrect.
The accuracy of the appraisal might be adversely affected by subse-
quent events. For example, at the time of the creation of a trust, a
patent may appear to have a remaining economic life of fifteen years,
and the trustee will value the asset accordingly. If, however, a compet-
ing invention comes on the market soon thereafter, the trustee's origi-
nal appraisal will greatly exceed the patent's actual market value.
Under section eleven of the Revised Act, a mistaken valuation can
have a severe effect on the rights of the trust beneficiaries. A paradig-
matic example can be seen in the case of George Bernard Shaw's
133. Despite the beneficial changes brought about by § I 1 of the Revised Act, § 10 of the
original Act remains in force in thirteen jurisdictions. 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 396 (Supp. 1978).
134. See text accompanying notes 46-65 and notes 90-109 supra.
135. REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 1(2), 7A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 429
(Master ed. 1978).
136. Id. § 11. The term assumes its primary significance in connection with depletable prop-
erty. Other applications arise in connection with probate income and unproductive property. Id.
§§ 5(b)(2), 12(a).
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will. 37 At the time of Shaw's death, the copyright value of Pygmalion
was insignificant. The following year, however, My Fair Lady was pro-
duced, with the result that the copyright value rose appreciably. Under
the mechanics of section eleven, an assessment of the copyright's "in-
ventory value" at Mr. Shaw's death would have seriously prejudiced
the income beneficiary. Conversely, in the case of an overvaluation of
a wasting asset, the income beneficiary would reap a windfall gain at
the expense of the remaindermen.
If there has been a mistake, of whatever kind, made in the trustee's
appraisal of a wasting asset held in trust, that mistake should not
prejudice the rights of one class of trust beneficiaries to the benefit of
the other. Yet that is precisely the result that obtains under the formu-
lation set forth in section eleven of the Revised Act. The task, there-
fore, is to construct a formula that will be sufficiently flexible to remedy
this defect while, at the same time, being consistent with the criteria
outlined above. 38
C. Proposed Revision
From the preceding discussion, it would appear that section eleven
of the Revised Act constitutes a substantial improvement over the simi-
lar provision contained in the original Act. This conclusion is predi-
cated upon the notion that the omission in section eleven of the
Revised Act of any reference to the situation in which the trustee is
empowered to retain original trust investments is more in keeping with
recognized fiduciary duties of impartiality and preservation of trust
corpus. There is still room, however, for significant improvement.
The principal failing of the present statutory scheme is that it re-
quires a trustee to attach afixed and absolute valuation to the wasting
asset as of the date it was received in trust. Such an attempt at valua-
tion ignores the hazards that inhere in the nature of the wasting asset
itself. Given the fallibility of human nature and the unpredictability of
future events, it is not at all unlikely that the trustee's efforts will result
in a mistaken valuation of the underlying asset, with consequent detri-
ment to one of the classes of beneficiaries in favor of the other. Be-
cause the value of the underlying asset can be known only as its actual
realizations are known from year to year, why not allow the value of
the asset to float up or down depending upon the revenues derived
137. Cf. Speelman v. Pascal, 10 N.Y.2d 313, 178 N.E.2d 723 (1961).
138. See text following note 13 supra.
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from the asset? In this manner the worth of the wasting investment
could be ascertained currently with a year by year demonstration of its
actual worth.
This aim can be realized by means of the following formula for
apportionment. First, the trustee should assign a tentative capital value
to the underlying asset.' 39 Tentative interest on this tentative capital
value will then be allowed to the income account at the rate of five
percent per annum. 140 The annual payment due to the income account
will be tentatively ascertained on the basis of this computation. The
annual payment due to the principal account will tentatively be the
amount that must be allocated to principal each year in order to have
the principal account equal the tentative capital value at the end of the
asset's economic life if the principal account earns interest compounded
annually. The combination of the tentative principal payment with the
tentative income payment will yield a sum that should represent the
participations in actual revenues received annually.' 4 ' It is likely, how-
ever, that there will be variances in the net return each year from the
figures thus tentatively ascertained. The figures, nevertheless, serve to
establish the ratio between the two accounts. This ratio is to be applied
to each year's earnings as actually ascertained. 42 In good years, the
capital value of the asset will rise because of its larger productivity and,
accordingly, the amount transferred to the principal account will ex-
ceed the tentatively fixed principal payment. Similarly, in good years,
the amount payable to the income account will be greater than the five
percent computed on the tentative principal value. Conversely, in bad
years, the percentage allocations will result in both principal and in-
come receiving their ratable share. In actual figures, each will get less
than it would take if an absolute standard were attempted for an unpre-
dictable future.
To illustrate the operation of this formula, assume the following
factual situation. A trustee holds in trust a leasehold estate, having a
139. The tentative capital value assigned to a given asset could be computed in much the same
way that the trustee currently determines the inventory value of an asset. Theoretically, the
trustee values an asset at the discounted present value of future earnings.
140. The five percent figure is simply continued from § 11 of the Revised Act.
141. See note 75 su.pra. A deduction for any expenses incurred by the trust in connection with
the wasting investment would have to be made in order to determine the net revenues.
142. On a somewhat analogous question, some courts have apportioned the proceeds realized
upon a delayed sale of unproductive property in a similar manner. See, e.g., Fidelity Union Trust
Co. v. Doyle, 135 N.J. Eq. 514, 39 A.2d 173 (1944); In re Chapal's Will, 269 N.Y. 464, 199 N.E.
762 (1936).
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remaining duration of ten years.1 43 The trustee assigns a tentative capi-
tal value to the leasehold estate of $250,000. The annual payment due
to the principal account, as tentatively ascertained under this proposal,
equals $19,876.15.144 At five percent per annum, the annual payment
tentatively due the income account is $12,500. Thus the ratio that the
amount payable to the principal account bears to the total amount re-
ceived in any one year is 61.392 percent. 14  On the basis of this ratio,
all revenues derived from the wasting asset will be apportioned be-
tween the principal and income account. If, in a given year, the net
revenues produced by the leasehold estate totalled $50,000, by applying
the constant percentage determined above, $30,695.67 would be alloca-
ble to the principal account with the remaining $19,304.33 being alloca-
ble to the income account. But, regardless of the specific amount that
the wasting property produces in a given year, this flexible formula
seeks to assure that each account will take its share of good and bad
years.
This result can be demonstrated through the following calcula-
tions. The tentative fair market value is arrived at by discounting pre-
dicted future payoffs to present value using the five percent rate of
return. A $250,000 fair market value means the trustees expect an
equal annual payoff of $32,376.15 ($250,000 multiplied by .1295046,
the annuity that has a present value of one at the end of ten years), or
unequal payoffs whose present value also equals $250,000. Suppose,
however, the leasehold does better than expected, thus generating
payoffs greater than $32,376.15 per year. The results are demonstrated
in the table that follows. As the table shows, under the proposed
method, at the end often years there will be an amount in the principal
143. As compared with the existing statutory scheme, the only additional duty imposed on
trustees is to compute the useful life of the wasting investment. In the case of a leasehold estate,
whether for life or for years, this determination should present no real difficulty. With respect to
the corpus of a trust that consists, in whole or in part, of rights under a copyright or a patent,
relevant statutory provisions that govern the duration of these interests should be determinative.
See 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 302-305 (1976); 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976).
144. This figure is arrived at by calculating the annual contribution to principal necessary in
order to have the principal account equal the tentative fair market value of $250,000 at the end of
the ten-year remaining useful life, assuming the annual allocations earn interest at 5% com-
pounded annually. That amount is $250,000 multiplied by .0795046, or $19,876.15. The figure
.0795046 is the annuity that at compound interest of 5% per year will accumulate to one in ten
years. See REEVES, INTEREST TABLES, supra note 75, at 68.
145.
19,876.15 19,876.15
= 61.391%
19,876.15 + 12,500 32,376.15
Note that the $32,376.15 denominator equals the expected annual payoff necessary to arrive at the
$250,000 present fair market value if the payoffs were equal each year.
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account equal to the fair market value as recomputed after knowing all
the payoffs. Moreover, the amounts allocated to income will have an
accumulated value equal to what the accumulated value would have
been if the true fair market value was known at the outset and the
income account received five percent of that value each year.
Under the proposed method, as the annual payoffs come in higher
than originally expected, higher amounts are allocated to both income
and principal by applying the constant ratio to the actual payoffs re-
ceived. Under the method in the current Uniform Principal and In-
come Act the income account would receive five percent of the original
inventory value, or $12,500 every year, regardless of an increase in
payoffs. The income beneficiaries thus will suffer the consequences of
the erroneously low initial valuation. The proposed method would also
fairly distribute the payoffs if they turned out to be lower than origi-
nally expected.
Therein lies the major difference between the tentative valuation
scheme and the existing statutory scheme. Under the existing method,
depending upon whether the valuation adopted by the trustee is high or
low, the gain or loss will inure solely to the advantage or disadvantage
of one of the classes of beneficiaries. 4 6 By spreading the risk of loss
among all the trust beneficiaries, this proposal enhances the likelihood
that equality of treatment between tenant and remainderman will be
achieved. 147
Judged in light of the criteria enunciated in the introductory por-
tion of this article, 148 this proposal more nearly realizes these objectives
than does the present statutory scheme. Let us examine each in turn.
The first criterion is whether the mode of apportionment allows
the trustee to administer the trust property in a manner that is consis-
tent with general fiduciary duties. In this instance, the trustee's duty of
146. See text accompanying notes 137-138 supra.
147. Although the proposed tentative valuation formula is tied to the appraised value of the
wasting asset in much the same fashion as is the existing statutory scheme, an important difference
does exist. Under § 11 of the Revised Act, the asset's inventory value will actually determine the
amount of revenues allocable to the income account and, by necessary implication, that portion
allocable to the capital account. Here, by way of contrast, the asset's tentative capital value is
merely being used as a mechanism by which to establish the applicable ratio. -
148. See text following note 13 supra.
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preserving trust corpus intact assumes primary significance.' 4 9 Under
the tentative valuation scheme, it is not at all improbable that, if the
tentative capital value initially assigned to the wasting asset by the
trustee is too high, the amount that will ultimately be allocated to the
principal account will diminish the principal value of the asset. The
argument might, therefore, be made that such a result, inasmuch as it
effects a "depletion" of the trust corpus, is injurious to the remainder-
man. But, has the value of the trust corpus really been impaired? The
fact of the matter is that, as things turned out, the appraisal value was
altogether too high, it never really reflected the true worth of the under-
lying asset. In fact, it was nothing more than a bookkeeping entry that
was used to establish the necessary ratio. Shall we artifically inflate the
value of the asset in order to validate the trustee's erroneous appraisal?
The second criterion, namely that of dealing impartially with the
differing classes of beneficiaries, has already been addressed. 50 To re-
iterate, by means of the ratio established as between the tentative prin-
cipal and the tentative income accounts, both the upside and downside
risks that inhere in a wasting asset are spread evenly between the prin-
cipal and income beneficiaries of the trust.
Finally, with respect to the third criterion, namely convenience of
administration, it is difficult to understand how the proposed system
would impose any greater burden on the trustee than currently ex-
ists. 5 ' Even if one were to assume, arguendo, that there would be some
administrative inconvenience resulting from the implementation of this
proposal, the goal of achieving greater equity as between tenant and
remainderman should more than offset whatever costs were entailed.
A proponent of the existing statutory scheme might very easily
contend that the inequities generated by that scheme are not sufficiently
great to justify revision. It cannot be gainsaid, however, that the ex-
isting uniform legislation has a very real effect on important property
rights. To the extent to which the existing legislation has a differential
effect upon the interests of the principal and income beneficiaries, ineq-
149. The trustee's duty of dealing impartially with the differing classes of beneficiaries will be
discussed in conjunction with the second criterion. See text accompanying note 150 infra.
150. See text accompanying notes 148-49 supra.
151. See note 143 supra. It is arguable that this task is already comprehended by the trustee's
duty to appraise the value of the wasting asset.
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uities result. If such inequities can be ameliorated by the tentative val-
uation scheme proposed herein with few, if any, costs, there would
seem to be little justification for its not receiving favorable legislative
treatment.

